the hands of a clever lawyer, that they are not much impressed even
if she contradicts herself or is proved mistaken. At best it is only a
mistake, not a deliberate lie. The lawyer thinks he owes a moral
obligation to his client and to himself to cross-examine. He is
compelled to go on. There is a musty tradition of the law that a trial
without cross-examination is not a proper trial. It is a legal fetish
and one of the things that is done. The judge expects it, the jury
expect it, the client expects it and the public.

The client pays his money and he ought not to be disappointed. If it
were omitted altogether, the judge and jury might not feel the loss so
bitterly. Perhaps they might prefer it and the question for the lawyer
is whether it is better to satisfy the client or the jury. In this
quandary the lawyer may forget that the main point is to win the
battle. When the case is lost the client does not care at all how
brilliantly the lawyer looked, acted, or fought.

If the lawyer reasons he will say:

"If the object of my cross-examination is to show that the witness is
not telling the truth, have I much chance of getting him to confess
the fact?" The witness knows something about perjury. He is afraid and
he has heard about those pitfalls of cross-examination. Does the
lawyer remember his own hopeful son and how only yesterday he could
not get him to admit stealing the cake even with the prospect of
immediately impending punishment? Only that little rim of chocolate
about the ears was the proof. Even the deaf little child, who is not
as intelligent as the witness, will not admit that he was untruthful.
But still he goes on cross-examining.