permanently continue. Just how far Lincoln realized what he was doing in
refusing to compromise will never be known. Three months afterward, he
took a course which seems to imply that his vision during the interim
had expanded, had opened before him a new revelation of the nature of
his problem. At the earlier date Lincoln and the Southern people--not
the Southern machine--were looking at the one problem from opposite
points of view, and were locating the significance of the problem in
different features. To Lincoln, the heart of the matter was slavery. To
the Southerners, including the men who had voted lack of confidence in
Breckinridge, the heart of the matter was the sphere of influence. What
the Southern majority wanted was not the policy of the slave profiteers
but a secure future for expansion, a guarantee that Southern life,
social, economic, cultural, would not be merged with the life of the
opposite section: in a word, preservation of "dominion" status. In
Lincoln's mind, slavery being the main issue, this "dominion" issue was
incidental--a mere outgrowth of slavery that should begin to pass
away with slavery's restriction. In the Southern mind, a community
consciousness, the determination to be a people by themselves, nation
within the nation, was the issue, and slavery was the incident. To
repeat, it is impossible to say what Lincoln would have done had he
comprehended the Southern attitude. His near horizon which had kept
him all along from grasping the negative side of the Southern movement
prevented his perception of this tragic instance of cross-purposes.

Lacking this perception, his thoughts had centered themselves on a
recent activity of the slave profiteers. They had clamored for the
annexation of new territory to the south of us. Various attempts had
been made to create an international crisis looking toward the seizure
of Cuba. Then, too, bold adventurers had staked their heads, seeking to
found slave-holding communities in Central America. Why might not such