policy was inevitable. Sumter must be evacuated.

Even before the inauguration, he had broached this idea to Lincoln. He
had tried to keep Lincoln from inserting in the inaugural the words,
"The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy and possess
the property and places belonging to the government." He had proposed
instead, "The power confided in me shall be used indeed with efficacy,
but also with discretion, in every case and exigency, according to
the circumstances actually existing, and with a view and a hope of
a peaceful solution of the national troubles, and the restoration of
fraternal sympathies and affections."(6) With the rejection of Seward's
proffered revision, a difference between them in policy began to
develop. Lincoln, says one of his secretaries, accepted Seward's main
purpose but did not share his "optimism."(7) It would be truer to say
that in this stage of his development, he was lacking in audacity. In
his eager search for advice, he had to strike a balance between the
daring Seward who at this moment built entirely on his own power of
political devination, and the cautious remainder of the Cabinet who
had their ears to the ground trying their best to catch the note of
authority in the rumblings of vox populi. For his own part, Lincoln
began with two resolves: to go very cautiously,--and not give something
for nothing. Far from him, as yet, was that plunging mood which in
Seward pushed audacity to the verge of a gamble. However, just previous
to the inauguration, he took a cautious step in Seward's direction.
Virginia, like all the other States of the upper South, was torn by the
question which side to take. There was a "Union" party in Virginia, and
a "Secession" party. A committee of leading Unionists conferred with
Lincoln. They saw the immediate problem very much as Seward did. They
believed that if time were allowed, the crisis could be tided over and
the Union restored; but the first breath of war would wreck their hopes.