meetings, the talk of leaders, local elections, formed a confused clamor
which each listener interpreted according to his predisposition. The
members of the Cabinet in their relative isolation at Washington found
it exceedingly difficult to make up their minds what the people were
really saying. Of but one thing they were certain, and that was that
they represented a minority party. Before committing themselves any way,
it was life and death to know what portion of the North would stand by
them.(11)

At this point began a perplexity that was to torment the President
almost to the verge of distraction. How far could he trust his military
advisers? Old General Scott was at the head of the army. He had once
been a striking, if not a great figure. Should his military advice be
accepted as final? Scott informed Lincoln that Sumter was short of food
and that any attempt to relieve it would call for a much larger force
than the government could muster. Scott urged him to withdraw the
garrison. Lincoln submitted the matter to the Cabinet. He asked for
their opinions in writing.(12) Five advised taking Scott at his word and
giving up all thought of relieving Sumter. There were two dissenters.
The Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon Portland Chase, struck the
key-note of his later political career by an elaborate argument on
expediency. If relieving Sumter would lead to civil war, Chase was not
in favor of relief; but on the whole he did not think that civil
war would result, and therefore, on the whole, he favored a relief
expedition. One member of the Cabinet, Montgomery Blair, the Postmaster
General, an impetuous, fierce man, was vehement for relief at all costs.
Lincoln wanted to agree with Chase and Blair. He reasoned that if the
fort was given up, the necessity under which it was done would not
be fully understood; that by many it would be construed as part of a
voluntary policy, that at home it would discourage the friends of the