to his fears: the South had as good cause for leaving the Union as
the colonies had for leaving the British Empire. A little later, he
formulated his ultimate conclusion,--which like many of his ultimates
proved to be transitory,--and declared that if any group of Southern
States "choose to form an independent nation, they have a clear moral
right to do so," and pledging himself and his followers to do "our best
to forward their views."

Greeley wielded through The Tribune more influence, perhaps, than was
possessed by any other Republican with the single exception of Lincoln.
His newspaper constituency was enormous, and the relation between
the leader and the led was unusually close. He was both oracle and
barometer. As a symptom of the Republican panic, as a cause increasing
that panic, he was of first importance.

Meanwhile Congress had met. And at once, the most characteristic
peculiarity of the moment was again made emphatic. The popular
majorities and the political machines did not coincide. Both in the
North and in the South a minority held the situation in the hollow of
its hand. The Breckinridge Democrats, despite their repudiation in the
presidential vote, included so many of the Southern politicians, they
were so well organized, they had scored such a menacing victory with
the aid of Rhett in South Carolina, they had played so skilfully on the
fears of the South at large, their leaders were such skilled managers,
that they were able to continue for the moment the recognized spokesmen
of the South at Washington. They lost no time defining their position.
If the Union were not to be sundered, the Republicans must pledge
themselves to a new and extensive compromise; it must be far different
from those historic compromises that had preceded it. Three features
must characterize any new agreement: The South must be dealt with as