a. The relation of man to the world around him,--in what sense and within
what limits can he withdraw from its laws or assert himself against them
(Freedom and Necessity), and what is that which we suppose to be thus
independent and which we call ourselves? How does the inward differ from
the outward and what is the relation between them, and where do we draw the
line by which we separate mind from matter, the soul from the body? Is the
mind active or passive, or partly both? Are its movements identical with
those of the body, or only preconcerted and coincident with them, or is one
simply an aspect of the other?

b. What are we to think of time and space? Time seems to have a nearer
connexion with the mind, space with the body; yet time, as well as space,
is necessary to our idea of either. We see also that they have an analogy
with one another, and that in Mathematics they often interpenetrate. Space
or place has been said by Kant to be the form of the outward, time of the
inward sense. He regards them as parts or forms of the mind. But this is
an unfortunate and inexpressive way of describing their relation to us.
For of all the phenomena present to the human mind they seem to have most
the character of objective existence. There is no use in asking what is
beyond or behind them; we cannot get rid of them. And to throw the laws of
external nature which to us are the type of the immutable into the
subjective side of the antithesis seems to be equally inappropriate.

c. When in imagination we enter into the closet of the mind and withdraw
ourselves from the external world, we seem to find there more or less
distinct processes which may be described by the words, 'I perceive,' 'I
feel,' 'I think,' 'I want,' 'I wish,' 'I like,' 'I dislike,' 'I fear,' 'I
know,' 'I remember,' 'I imagine,' 'I dream,' 'I act,' 'I endeavour,' 'I
hope.' These processes would seem to have the same notions attached to
them in the minds of all educated persons. They are distinguished from one