determine what history, what philosophy has contributed to them; to
distinguish the original, simple elements from the manifold and complex
applications of them, would be a long enquiry too far removed from the
question which we are now pursuing.

Bearing in mind the distinction which we have been seeking to establish
between our earliest and our most mature ideas of morality, we may now
proceed to state the theory of Utility, not exactly in the words, but in
the spirit of one of its ablest and most moderate supporters (Mill's
Utilitarianism):--'That which alone makes actions either right or desirable
is their utility, or tendency to promote the happiness of mankind, or, in
other words, to increase the sum of pleasure in the world. But all
pleasures are not the same: they differ in quality as well as in quantity,
and the pleasure which is superior in quality is incommensurable with the
inferior. Neither is the pleasure or happiness, which we seek, our own
pleasure, but that of others,--of our family, of our country, of mankind.
The desire of this, and even the sacrifice of our own interest to that of
other men, may become a passion to a rightly educated nature. The
Utilitarian finds a place in his system for this virtue and for every
other.'

Good or happiness or pleasure is thus regarded as the true and only end of
human life. To this all our desires will be found to tend, and in
accordance with this all the virtues, including justice, may be explained.
Admitting that men rest for a time in inferior ends, and do not cast their
eyes beyond them, these ends are really dependent on the greater end of
happiness, and would not be pursued, unless in general they had been found
to lead to it. The existence of such an end is proved, as in Aristotle's
time, so in our own, by the universal fact that men desire it. The
obligation to promote it is based upon the social nature of man; this sense