considerably agitated, in Congress and out, and had enlisted to some
extent the sympathies of foreign powers who desired a shorter passage to
the Pacific Ocean, the East Indies, and the markets of Cathay, than the
stormy ones around the southern capes of either hemisphere.

This agitation finally culminated in diplomatic correspondence between
the representatives of Great Britain and the United States relative to
the construction of such a means of communication and the rights of the
two nations to the same, resulting in the treaty. In April, 1850, the
Senate of the United States, by a very large vote, ratified and
confirmed this treaty, notwithstanding it was vigorously opposed by such
men as Stephen A. Douglas and Lewis Cass, then in the zenith of their
fame.

It appears in the Congressional record of 1850, and subsequently, that
the treaty was ratified without a very clear understanding of its
meaning; and it was even hinted, in rather plain language, that the
representative of Great Britain had been too sharp, too diplomatic for
his American brother, and had overreached him. It further appeared that
the honorable Senate was sadly deficient in knowledge of geography, and
national boundaries; for it is matter of record, that many Senators
voted for the ratification under the impression that British Honduras
was included in the territory of Guatamala, and that the British
settlements were in that republic; while, as a fact, Balize or British
Honduras was on the easterly side of the Isthmus, never had been a part
of that republic, and the British settlements were, and always had been,
in Yucatan. They further understood the treaty to say, that neither
government should occupy, fortify, or colonize Nicaragua, Costa Rica,
the Mosquito Coast, or any part of Central America; but it is a fact,
that at the very date of the treaty, at the date of the ratification,