conflict and the actors in each. There are chapters in the work which
will always provoke discussion, and some of the author's conclusions in
special instances may be controverted; still, the great merits of the
work, as a whole, cannot but be generally and cordially recognized.

The work is distinctly a _military_ history, without, however,
ignoring purely civil transactions when an account of them is needed to
throw light on the military movements. The author's theory, relative to
the origin of the war may be stated thus:--The South saw that, as the
North increased in prosperity, it was decreasing, and was losing the
balance of power which it had always held since the adoption of the
Constitution. It determined, therefore, to force slavery into the new
States and Territories; and, failing in this, it foresaw but two
alternatives,--either to give up the cause as lost, or to initiate a
conflict and a satisfactory peace from its opponents. It chose the
latter, and was thwarted.

The first volume treats of the American army, past and present, of
Secession, and the events of the war to the Spring of 1862; the second
volume continues the narrative of events from Gen. McClellan's Peninsula
Campaign to the issuing of the Emancipation Proclamation. The author,
in considering the relations of the commanding general to the
administration, praises the former and blames the latter; and, in
commending the campaign, shows himself a poor master of the art of war,
and in some respects an indifferent critic of practical military
operations. The Count of Paris wrote these chapters in 1874.--twelve
years after the events, and with ample testimony at his command. It is
strange that he could not reach the conclusion, then and now commonly
held, that McClellan's treatment of President Lincoln throughout his
entire career seems to have been highly insubordinate and apparently