looked upon this great bid for world power on the part, of the German
Empire as purely a campaign on the Western Front, all other campaigns in
other corners of the globe being mere "side shows." I was always a firm
and consistent supporter of the "East End" school of strategy. I looked
upon the war as a _World War_ and, since the decisive Battle of the
Marne in September, 1914, when the German hopes of complete and crushing
victory in the West were shattered (which decision was still more
finally confirmed at First Ypres), as primarily a south-eastern war. I
held with that great statesman and strategist, Mr. Winston Churchill,
that Constantinople was "the great strategic nerve-centre of the world
war." I realized that a deadlock had been reached on the Western Front,
and that nothing was to be hoped from any frontal attack there; and I
also realized that Germany held Constantinople and the Dardanelles--the
gateway to the East. And the trend of German foreign policy and German
strategy convinced me that it was in the Near East that the menace to
our Empire lay. There was our most vulnerable part; while Germany held
that gateway, the glamour of the East, with its possibilities of
victories like those of Alexander, and an empire like that one which was
the great Napoleon's early dream, would always be a great temptation to
German strategists. I therefore always used to assert that "The side
which holds Constantinople when peace terms come to be discussed is the
side which has won the war," and I think the events of September, 1918,
have proved that my view and prophecy were correct. I firmly believe
that if unity of command under Marshal Foch and Sir Henry Wilson, with
the following decisive victories of D'Esperey at Cerna and Allenby at
Armageddon in September, 1918, bringing about the capitulation of
Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire, and the surrender of Constantinople to
the Allies, had not been attained last year the war would still be in
progress. And I therefore hold that it is impossible to estimate the
debt which the Allies owe to those statesmen who brought about that