_presentative_ in relation to the object which is supposed to be
immediately present to the mind at the moment.[3] Hence the convenience
of recognizing the popular classification, and of making it our
starting-point in the present case.

All knowledge which has any appearance of being directly reached,
immediate, or self-evident, that is to say, of not being inferred from
other knowledge, may be divided into four principal varieties: Internal
Perception or Introspection of the mind's own feelings;
External Perception; Memory; and Belief, in so far as it simulates the
form of direct knowledge. The first is illustrated in a man's
consciousness of a present feeling of pain or pleasure. The second and
the third kinds have already been spoken of, and are too familiar to
require illustration. It is only needful to remark here that, under
perception, or rather in close conjunction with it, I purpose dealing
with the knowledge of other's feelings, in so far as this assumes the
aspect of immediate knowledge. The term belief is here used to include
expectations and any other kinds of conviction that do not fall under
one of the other heads. An instance of a seemingly immediate belief
would be a prophetic prevision of a coming disaster, or a man's
unreasoned persuasion as to his own powers of performing a difficult
task.

It is, indeed, said by many thinkers that there are no legitimate
immediate beliefs; that all our expectations and other convictions about
things, in so far as they are sound, must repose on other genuinely
immediate knowledge, more particularly sense-perception and memory.
This difficult question need not be discussed here. It is allowed by all
that there is a multitude of beliefs which we hold tenaciously and on
which we are ready to act, which, to the mature mind, wear the