term, nor would the intention of the agent be at rest; while if there
is no first thing among those that are ordained to the end, none would
begin to work at anything, and counsel would have no term, but would
continue indefinitely.

On the other hand, nothing hinders infinity from being in things that
are ordained to one another not essentially but accidentally; for
accidental causes are indeterminate. And in this way it happens that
there is an accidental infinity of ends, and of things ordained to the
end.

Reply Obj. 1: The very nature of good is that something flows from
it, but not that it flows from something else. Since, therefore, good
has the nature of end, and the first good is the last end, this
argument does not prove that there is no last end; but that from the
end, already supposed, we may proceed downwards indefinitely towards
those things that are ordained to the end. And this would be true if
we considered but the power of the First Good, which is infinite.
But, since the First Good diffuses itself according to the intellect,
to which it is proper to flow forth into its effects according to a
certain fixed form; it follows that there is a certain measure to the
flow of good things from the First Good from Which all other goods
share the power of diffusion. Consequently the diffusion of goods
does not proceed indefinitely but, as it is written (Wis. 11:21), God
disposes all things "in number, weight and measure."

Reply Obj. 2: In things which are of themselves, reason begins from
principles that are known naturally, and advances to some term.
Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Poster. i, 3) that there is no
infinite process in demonstrations, because there we find a process