Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "God turns all
things to Himself as to their last end." But He is also man's last
end; because He alone is to be enjoyed by man, as Augustine says (De
Doctr. Christ. i, 5, 22). Therefore other things, too, concur in man's
last end.

Obj. 3: Further, man's last end is the object of the will. But the
object of the will is the universal good, which is the end of all.
Therefore other things, too, concur in man's last end.

_On the contrary,_ man's last end is happiness; which all men desire,
as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3, 4). But "happiness is not
possible for animals bereft of reason," as Augustine says (QQ. 83,
qu. 5). Therefore other things do not concur in man's last end.

_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the end is
twofold--the end "for which" and the end "by which"; viz. the thing
itself in which is found the aspect of good, and the use or
acquisition of that thing. Thus we say that the end of the movement of
a weighty body is either a lower place as "thing," or to be in a lower
place, as "use"; and the end of the miser is money as "thing," or
possession of money as "use."

If, therefore, we speak of man's last end as of the thing which is the
end, thus all other things concur in man's last end, since God is the
last end of man and of all other things. If, however, we speak of
man's last end, as of the acquisition of the end, then irrational
creatures do not concur with man in this end. For man and other
rational creatures attain to their last end by knowing and loving God:
this is not possible to other creatures, which acquire their last end,