Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in honors.
For happiness or bliss is "the reward of virtue," as the Philosopher
says (Ethic. i, 9). But honor more than anything else seems to be that
by which virtue is rewarded, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3).
Therefore happiness consists especially in honor.

Obj. 2: Further, that which belongs to God and to persons of great
excellence seems especially to be happiness, which is the perfect
good. But that is honor, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3).
Moreover, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:17): "To . . . the only God be
honor and glory." Therefore happiness consists in honor.

Obj. 3: Further, that which man desires above all is happiness. But
nothing seems more desirable to man than honor: since man suffers
loss in all other things, lest he should suffer loss of honor.
Therefore happiness consists in honor.

_On the contrary,_ Happiness is in the happy. But honor is not in the
honored, but rather in him who honors, and who offers deference to
the person honored, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5). Therefore
happiness does not consist in honor.

_I answer that,_ It is impossible for happiness to consist in honor.
For honor is given to a man on account of some excellence in him; and
consequently it is a sign and attestation of the excellence that is
in the person honored. Now a man's excellence is in proportion,
especially to his happiness, which is man's perfect good; and to its
parts, i.e. those goods by which he has a certain share of happiness.
And therefore honor can result from happiness, but happiness cannot