Whether Any Created Good Constitutes Man's Happiness?

Objection 1: It would seem that some created good constitutes man's
happiness. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that Divine wisdom
"unites the ends of first things to the beginnings of second things,"
from which we may gather that the summit of a lower nature touches
the base of the higher nature. But man's highest good is happiness.
Since then the angel is above man in the order of nature, as stated
in the First Part (Q. 111, A. 1), it seems that man's happiness
consists in man somehow reaching the angel.

Obj. 2: Further, the last end of each thing is that which, in
relation to it, is perfect: hence the part is for the whole, as for
its end. But the universe of creatures which is called the macrocosm,
is compared to man who is called the microcosm (Phys. viii, 2), as
perfect to imperfect. Therefore man's happiness consists in the whole
universe of creatures.

Obj. 3: Further, man is made happy by that which lulls his natural
desire. But man's natural desire does not reach out to a good
surpassing his capacity. Since then man's capacity does not include
that good which surpasses the limits of all creation, it seems that
man can be made happy by some created good. Consequently some created
good constitutes man's happiness.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 26): "As the soul
is the life of the body, so God is man's life of happiness: of Whom
it is written: 'Happy is that people whose God is the Lord' (Ps.
143:15)."