the catastrophe at Sarajevo the prevailing state of affairs showed
almost an improvement in the relations between Vienna and Belgrade.
But it was the calm before the storm. On June 28 the veil was rent
asunder, and from one moment to the next a catastrophe threatened the
world. The stone had started rolling.

At that time I was ambassador to Roumania. I was therefore only able
from a distance to watch developments in Vienna and Berlin.
Subsequently, however, I discussed events in those critical days with
numerous leading personalities, and from all that I heard have been
able to form a definite and clear view of the proceedings. I have no
doubt whatever that Berchtold, even in his dreams, had never thought
of a world war of such dimensions as it assumed; that he, above all,
was persuaded that England would remain neutral; and the German
Ambassador, Tschirsky, confirmed him in the conviction that a war
against France and Russia would inevitably end in victory. I believe
that the state of mind in which Count Berchtold addressed the
ultimatum to Serbia was such that he said to himself, either--and this
is the most favourable view--Serbia will accept the ultimatum, which
would mean a great diplomatic success; or she will refuse it, and
then, thanks to Germany's help, the victorious war against Russia and
France will effect the birth of a new and vastly stronger Monarchy. It
cannot for a moment be denied that this argument contained a series of
errors; but it must be stated that, according to my convictions, Count
Berchtold did not intend to incite war by the ultimatum, but hoped to
the very last to gain the victory by the pen, and that in the German
promises he saw a guarantee against a war in which the participators
and the chances of victory were equally erroneously estimated.

Berchtold could not have entertained any doubt that a Serbian war