he thought Austria would receive every satisfaction on accepting
negotiation. In any case the Serbians would be punished. Even without
a war Austria would receive a guarantee for the future.

Such were the contents of the communication from London sent by
Tschirsky, to which Bethmann added that he urgently requested the
Vienna Cabinet to accept the negotiation. On receiving this
information, Berchtold conveyed the news to the Emperor. His position
was this: that Russia was already at war with the Monarchy on the
evening of the same day on which the order for general mobilisation
was to be submitted to the Emperor, and it appeared doubtful to him
whether a postponement of their own mobilisation would be possible in
view of the Russian attack. He had also to take into consideration the
different parties prevailing in Russia, and no guarantee was
obtainable that those who were in favour of negotiation would gain the
day. Any postponement of mobilisation might in this case lead to
incalculable military consequences. Obviously hostilities had begun
without the knowledge and against the wishes of the Tsar; if they
were also to be carried on against his wish, then Austria-Hungary
would be too late.

I have never discussed this phase with Berchtold, but the material
placed at my disposal leaves no doubt that he felt bound to inquire
into this side of the question and then leave the decision to the
Emperor Francis Joseph.

On the following day, July 31, therefore, Tschirsky, at the Ballplatz,
communicated the contents of a telegram from King George to Prince
Henry of Prussia. It ran as follows:--