of certain conservative critics regarding the Fourth Gospel to Sir G.C.
Lewis's objections to Niebuhr's 'equally arbitrary reconstruction of
early Roman history.' From one point of view this comparison is
instructive. We have no means of testing the value of that eminent
writer's negative criticisms of early Roman history. But where
additional knowledge has enabled us to apply a test to his opinions, as,
for instance, respecting the interpretation of the Egyptian hieroglyphic
language, we find that his scepticism led him signally astray. It seems
to be assumed that, because the sceptical spirit has its proper function
in scientific inquiry (though even here its excesses will often impede
progress), therefore its exercise is equally useful and equally free
from danger in the domain of criticism. A moment's reflection however
will show that the cases are wholly different. In whatever relates to
morals and history--in short, to human life in all its developments--
where mathematical or scientific demonstration is impossible, and where
consequently everything depends on the even balance of the judicial
faculties, scepticism must be at least as fatal to the truth as
credulity.

The author of _Supernatural Religion_ proposes to himself the task of
demonstrating that the miraculous element in Christianity is a delusion.
The work is divided into three parts. The first part undertakes to prove
that miracles are not only highly improbable, but antecedently
incredible, so that no amount of testimony can overcome the objections
to them. As a subsidiary aim, he endeavours to show that the sort of
evidence, which, under the most favourable circumstances, we should be
likely to obtain in the early Christian ages, ought not to inspire
confidence. The second and third parts are occupied in examining the
actual witnesses themselves, that is, the four Gospels; the second being
devoted to the Synoptists, and the third to St John. The main contention