145. (v) _Self-compulsion is not contrary to rationality and liberty._ We
have shown that man has an internal and an external of thought; that they
are distinguishable as prior and subsequent or higher and lower; and that
being so distinct they can act separately and also jointly. They act
separately when a man speaks and acts from the external of his thought
otherwise than he thinks and wills inwardly; they act jointly when he
speaks and acts as he thinks and wills. The latter is common with the
sincere, the former with the insincere.

[2] Inasmuch as the internal and the external of the mind are so
distinct, the internal can even fight with the external and by combat
drive it to compliance. Conflict arises when the man deems evils to be
sins and resolves to desist from them. When he desists, a door is opened
and the lusts of evil which have occupied the internal of thought are
cast out by the Lord and affections of good are implanted in their place.
This occurs in the internal of thought. But the enjoyments of evil lust
which occupy the external of thought cannot be cast out at the same time;
conflict arises therefore between the internal and the external of
thought. The internal wants to cast out those enjoyments because they are
enjoyments of evil and do not agree with the affections of good in which
the internal now is, and wants to introduce in their place enjoyments of
good which do agree. These are what are called goods of charity. From the
disagreement comes the conflict which, if it grows severe, is called
temptation.

[3] Now as man is man by virtue of the internal of his thought, for this
is his very spirit, obviously he compels himself when he compels the
external of his thought to comply or to receive the enjoyments of his
affections or the goods of charity. Plainly this is not contrary to