After we had our brush with France, however, in 1798, and after
Truxtun's brilliant victory over the French frigate L'Insurgente
in the following year, it occurred to our government that perhaps
there was a more direct as well as a more manly way of dealing
with the Barbary pirates than by feebly paying them tribute, and
in 1801 a small squadron, under Commodore Dale, proceeded to the
Mediterranean.

At the same time events occurred which showed strikingly the
absurdity as well as the weakness of this policy of paying
blackmail to pirates. The Bashaw of Tripoli, complaining that we
had given more money to some of the Algerian ministers than we
had to him, and also that we had presented Algiers with a
frigate, declared war upon us, and cut down the flag-staff in
front of the residence of the American consul. At the same time,
and for the same reason, Morocco and Tunis began to grumble at
the treatment which they had received. The fact was that, with
nations as with individuals, when the payment of blackmail is
once begun there is no end to it. The appearance, however, of our
little squadron in the Mediterranean showed at once the
superiority of a policy of force over one of cowardly submission.
Morocco and Tunis immediately stopped their grumbling and came to
terms with the United States, and this left us free to deal with
Tripoli.

Commodore Dale had sailed before the declaration of war by
Tripoli was known, and he was therefore hampered by his orders,
which permitted him only to protect our commerce, and which
forbade actual hostilities. Nevertheless, even under these
limited orders, the Enterprise, of twelve guns, commanded by