had been discussed in England before I left. I had seen much said
about it in the English papers since, and it also had become the
subject of very hot question among the politicians of the Northern
States. The measure had at that time given more umbrage to the
North than anything else done or said by England from the beginning
of the war up to that time, except the declaration made by Lord
John Russell in the House of Commons as to the neutrality to be
preserved by England between the two belligerents. The argument
used by the Northern States was this: if France collects men and
material of war in the neighborhood of England, England considers
herself injured, calls for an explanation, and talks of invasion.
Therefore, as England is now collecting men and material of war in
our neighborhood, we will consider ourselves injured. It does not
suit us to ask for an explanation, because it is not our habit to
interfere with other nations. We will not pretend to say that we
think we are to be invaded. But as we clearly are injured, we will
express our anger at that injury, and when the opportunity shall
come will take advantage of having that new grievance.

As we all know, a very large increase of force was sent when we
were still in doubt as to the termination of the Trent affair, and
imagined that war was imminent. But the sending of that large
force did not anger the Americans as the first dispatch of troops
to Canada had angered them. Things had so turned out that measures
of military precaution were acknowledged by them to be necessary.
I cannot, however, but think that Mr. Seward might have spared that
offer to send British troops across Maine, and so also have all his
countrymen thought by whom I have heard the matter discussed.

As to any attempt at invasion of Canada by the Americans, or idea