evidence now shows that it did meditate such an attack. England did not
desire an acre of German ground. France had assuredly not forgotten
Alsace and Lorraine, but France would have had no support, and would
have failed ignominiously, in an aggressive campaign to secure those
provinces. On the other hand, an immense and weighty literature, which
is unfortunately very little known in England, has familiarised Germany
for fifteen years with aggressive ideas. The most authoritative writers
claimed that, as they said repeatedly, "Germany must and will expand";
and leagues which numbered millions of subscribers propagated this
sentiment in every school and village. A definite demand was made
throughout Germany for more colonies and a longer coast-line on the
North Sea; and it was in relation to this ambition that England, France,
and Russia were represented--and justly represented--as Germany's
opponents. England, in particular, was described as the great dragon
which watched at the gates of Germany and grimly forbade its
"development." It is in this sense that the bulk of the German people
maintain that their action is defensive.

In passing, let me emphasise this peculiar economic difference between
the four nations. Russia had a vast territory in which her people might
develop. France had no surplus population, and had a large colonial
field for such of her children as desired adventure abroad or would
escape the competition at home. England had, in Canada and Australasia
and South Africa, a magnificent estate for her surplus population. None
of these Powers had an economic ground for aggression. Germany was
undoubtedly in a far less fortunate position, and had an overflowing
population. Six hundred thousand men and women (mostly men) had to leave
the fatherland every year, and, as the colonies were small and
unsatisfactory, they were scattered and lost among the nations of the
earth. The proper attitude toward Germany is, not to gratify the cunning