connivance, the rebellion was allowed to make its way. Under him,
and by his officers, arms and ships and men and money were sent away
from those points at which it was known that they would be needed,
if it were intended to put down the coming rebellion, and to those
points at which it was known that they would be needed, if it were
intended to foster the coming rebellion. But Mr. Buchanan had no
eager feeling in favor of secession. He was not of that stuff of
which are made Davis, and Toombs, and Slidell. But treason was
easier to him than loyalty. Remonstrance was made to him, pointing
out the misfortunes which his action, or want of action, would bring
upon the country. "Not in my time," he answered. "It will not be
in my time." So that he might escape unscathed out of the fire,
this chief ruler of a nation of thirty millions of men was content
to allow treason and rebellion to work their way! I venture to say
so much here as showing how impossible it was that Mr. Lincoln's
government, on its coming into office, should have given to the
South, not what the South had asked, for the South had not asked,
but what the South had taken, what the South had tried to filch.
Had the South waited for secession till Mr. Lincoln had been in his
chair, I could understand that England should sympathize with her.
For myself I cannot agree to that scuttling of the ship by the
captain on the day which was to see the transfer of his command to
another officer.

The Southern States were driven into rebellion by no wrongs
inflicted on them; but their desire for secession is not on that
account matter for astonishment. It would have been surprising had
they not desired secession. Secession of one kind, a very practical
secession, had already been forced upon them by circumstances. They
had become a separate people, dissevered from the North by habits,