as these masses are animated with a spirit which will infuse vigour
into the action or otherwise. It is quite possible for such a state
of feeling to exist between two States that a very trifling political
motive for War may produce an effect quite disproportionate--in fact, a
perfect explosion.

This applies to the efforts which the political object will call forth
in the two States, and to the aim which the military action shall
prescribe for itself. At times it may itself be that aim, as, for
example, the conquest of a province. At other times the political object
itself is not suitable for the aim of military action; then such a one
must be chosen as will be an equivalent for it, and stand in its place
as regards the conclusion of peace. But also, in this, due attention to
the peculiar character of the States concerned is always supposed. There
are circumstances in which the equivalent must be much greater than the
political object, in order to secure the latter. The political object
will be so much the more the standard of aim and effort, and have more
influence in itself, the more the masses are indifferent, the less that
any mutual feeling of hostility prevails in the two States from other
causes, and therefore there are cases where the political object almost
alone will be decisive.

If the aim of the military action is an equivalent for the political
object, that action will in general diminish as the political object
diminishes, and in a greater degree the more the political object
dominates. Thus it is explained how, without any contradiction in
itself, there may be Wars of all degrees of importance and energy, from
a War of extermination down to the mere use of an army of observation.
This, however, leads to a question of another kind which we have
hereafter to develop and answer.