TO BE ONLY POSSIBLE ON ONE SIDE IN ANY CASE.

If two parties have armed themselves for strife, then a feeling of
animosity must have moved them to it; as long now as they continue
armed, that is, do not come to terms of peace, this feeling must exist;
and it can only be brought to a standstill by either side by one single
motive alone, which is, THAT HE WAITS FOR A MORE FAVOURABLE MOMENT FOR
ACTION. Now, at first sight, it appears that this motive can never exist
except on one side, because it, eo ipso, must be prejudicial to the
other. If the one has an interest in acting, then the other must have an
interest in waiting.

A complete equilibrium of forces can never produce a suspension of
action, for during this suspension he who has the positive object (that
is, the assailant) must continue progressing; for if we should imagine
an equilibrium in this way, that he who has the positive object,
therefore the strongest motive, can at the same time only command the
lesser means, so that the equation is made up by the product of the
motive and the power, then we must say, if no alteration in this
condition of equilibrium is to be expected, the two parties must make
peace; but if an alteration is to be expected, then it can only be
favourable to one side, and therefore the other has a manifest interest
to act without delay. We see that the conception of an equilibrium
cannot explain a suspension of arms, but that it ends in the question of
the EXPECTATION OF A MORE FAVOURABLE MOMENT.

Let us suppose, therefore, that one of two States has a positive object,
as, for instance, the conquest of one of the enemy's provinces--which
is to be utilised in the settlement of peace. After this conquest, his
political object is accomplished, the necessity for action ceases, and