future than to assume the offensive or make peace at present. Now, being
convinced that the superiority of the defensive(*) (rightly understood)
is very great, and much greater than may appear at first sight, we
conceive that the greater number of those periods of inaction which
occur in war are thus explained without involving any contradiction.
The weaker the motives to action are, the more will those motives be
absorbed and neutralised by this difference between attack and defence,
the more frequently, therefore, will action in warfare be stopped, as
indeed experience teaches.

(*) It must be remembered that all this antedates by some
years the introduction of long-range weapons.


18 A SECOND GROUND CONSISTS IN THE IMPERFECT KNOWLEDGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES.

But there is still another cause which may stop action in War, viz., an
incomplete view of the situation. Each Commander can only fully know his
own position; that of his opponent can only be known to him by reports,
which are uncertain; he may, therefore, form a wrong judgment with
respect to it upon data of this description, and, in consequence of that
error, he may suppose that the power of taking the initiative rests with
his adversary when it lies really with himself. This want of perfect
insight might certainly just as often occasion an untimely action as
untimely inaction, and hence it would in itself no more contribute
to delay than to accelerate action in War. Still, it must always be
regarded as one of the natural causes which may bring action in War to a
standstill without involving a contradiction. But if we reflect how much
more we are inclined and induced to estimate the power of our opponents
too high than too low, because it lies in human nature to do so, we