of a great decision by arms, OUR MEANS MUST ON THAT ACCOUNT BE CHANGED
AGAINST OUR WILL, IN ORDER TO CORRESPOND WITH HIS. Then all depends on
the issue of the act of destruction; but of course it is evident
that, ceteris paribus, in this act we must be at a disadvantage in all
respects because our views and our means had been directed in part
upon other objects, which is not the case with the enemy. Two different
objects of which one is not part, the other exclude each other, and
therefore a force which may be applicable for the one may not serve for
the other. If, therefore, one of two belligerents is determined to seek
the great decision by arms, then he has a high probability of success,
as soon as he is certain his opponent will not take that way, but
follows a different object; and every one who sets before himself any
such other aim only does so in a reasonable manner, provided he acts on
the supposition that his adversary has as little intention as he has of
resorting to the great decision by arms.

But what we have here said of another direction of views and forces
relates only to other POSITIVE OBJECTS, which we may propose to
ourselves in War, besides the destruction of the enemy's force, not
by any means to the pure defensive, which may be adopted with a view
thereby to exhaust the enemy's forces. In the pure defensive the
positive object is wanting, and therefore, while on the defensive, our
forces cannot at the same time be directed on other objects; they can
only be employed to defeat the intentions of the enemy.

We have now to consider the opposite of the destruction of the enemy's
armed force, that is to say, the preservation of our own. These two
efforts always go together, as they mutually act and react on each
other; they are integral parts of one and the same view, and we have
only to ascertain what effect is produced when one or the other has the