pity and fear through imitation, it is evident that this quality must be
impressed upon the incidents.

Let us then determine what are the circumstances which strike us as
terrible or pitiful.

Actions capable of this effect must happen between persons who are either
friends or enemies or indifferent to one another. If an enemy kills an
enemy, there is nothing to excite pity either in the act or the
intention, --except so far as the suffering in itself is pitiful. So
again with indifferent persons. But when the tragic incident occurs
between those who are near or dear to one another--if, for example, a
brother kills, or intends to kill, a brother, a son his father, a mother
her son, a son his mother, or any other deed of the kind is done---these
are the situations to be looked for by the poet. He may not indeed
destroy the framework of the received legends--the fact, for instance,
that Clytemnestra was slain by Orestes and Eriphyle by Alcmaeon but he
ought to show invention of his own, and skilfully handle the traditional
material. Let us explain more clearly what is meant by skilful handling.

The action may be done consciously and with knowledge of the persons, in
the manner of the older poets. It is thus too that Euripides makes Medea
slay her children. Or, again, the deed of horror may be done, but done in
ignorance, and the tie of kinship or friendship be discovered afterwards.
The Oedipus of Sophocles is an example. Here, indeed, the incident is
outside the drama proper; but cases occur where it falls within the
action of the play: one may cite the Alcmaeon of Astydamas, or Telegonus
in the Wounded Odysseus. Again, there is a third case,--act with knowledge of the persons and then not to act. The fourth case
is> when some one is about to do an irreparable deed through ignorance,