again be."

Mitchell, whose account is a fortnight later than the Dialogue
itself, does confess, "My Lord, these reasons, though unhappily the
thing seems to have failed, 'appear to me to be solid and
unanswerable.'" Much more do they to Tempelhof, who sees deeper
into the bottom of them than Mitchell did; and finds that the
failure is only superficial. [Mitchell, Memoirs and
Papers, ii. 160 (Despatch, "June 30th, 1760");
Tempelhof, iv. 44.] The real success, thinks Tempelhof, would be,
Could the King manoeuvre himself into Silesia, and entice a
cunctatory Daun away with him thither. A cunctatory Daun to preside
over matters THERE, in his superstitiously cautious way;
leaving Saxony free to the Reichsfolk,--whom a Hulsen, left with
his small remnant in Schlettau, might easily take charge of, till
Silesia were settled? "The plan was bold, was new, and completely
worthy of Friedrich," votes Tempelhof; "and it required the most
consummate delicacy of execution. To lure Daun on, always with the
prospect open to him of knocking you on the head, and always by
your rapidity and ingenuity to take care that he never got it
done." This is Tempelhof's notion: and this, sure enough, was
actually Friedrich's mode of management in the weeks following;
though whether already altogether planned in his head, or only
gradually planning itself, as is more likely, nobody can say.
We will look a very little into the execution, concerning which
there is no dubiety:--

WEDNESDAY, 18th JUNE, "Friedrich," as predicted to Mitchell, the
night before, "did start punctually, in three columns, at 3 A.M.
[Sun just rising]; and, after a hot march, got encamped on the