been thought, it was merely the successor of fresh suit and lynch
law, /1/ this also is the child of vengeance, even more clearly
than the other.

The desire for vengeance imports an opinion that its object is
actually and personally to blame. It takes an internal standard,
not an objective or external one, and condemns its victim by
that. The question is whether such a standard is still accepted
either in this primitive form, or in some more refined
development, as is commonly supposed, and as seems not
impossible, considering the relative slowness with which the
criminal law has improved.

It certainly may be argued, with some force, that it has never
ceased to be one object of punishment to satisfy the desire for
vengeance. The argument will be made plain by considering those
instances in which, for one reason or another, compensation for a
wrong is out of the question.

Thus an act may be of such a kind as to make indemnity impossible
by putting an end to the principal sufferer, as in the case of
murder or manslaughter.

Again, these and other crimes, like forgery, although directed
against an individual, tend to make others feel unsafe, and this
general insecurity does not admit of being paid for.

Again, there are cases where there are no means of enforcing
indemnity. In Macaulay's draft of the Indian Penal Code, breaches
of contract for the carriage of passengers, were made criminal.