The King hoped to have brought Prince Charles to the battle between
Benneschan and Kannupitz, but in vain: the Saxons, during the
night, had entered a battery of three-and-twenty cannon on a mound
which separated two ponds: this was the precise road by which the
King meant to make the attack.

Thus were we obliged to abandon Bohemia. The dearth, both for man
and horse, began to grow extreme. The weather was bad; the roads
and ruts were deep; marches were continual, and alarms and attacks
from the enemy's light troops became incessant. The discontent all
these inspired was universal, and this occasioned the great loss of
the army.

Under such circumstances, had Prince Charles continued to harass us,
by persuading us into Silesia, had he made a winter campaign,
instead of remaining indolently at ease in Bohemia, we certainly
should not have vanquished him, the year following, at Strigau; but
he only followed at a distance, as far as the Bohemian frontiers.
This gave Frederic time to recover, and the more effectually because
the Austrians had the imprudence to permit the return of deserters.

This was a repetition of what had happened to Charles XII. when he
suffered his Russian prisoners to return home, who afterwards so
effectually punished his contempt of them at the battle of Pultawa.

Prague was obliged to be abandoned, with considerable loss; and
Trenck seized on Tabor, Budweis, and Frauenberg, where he took
prisoners the regiments of Walrabe Kreutz.

No one would have been better able to give a faithful history of