on the opposite bank, he started himself to follow the same road and
cross at the same ford, giving orders to de Guise and de la Trimouille to
regulate the march of the rear guard by that of the centre, just as he
had regulated their march by that of the van. His orders were punctually
carried out; and about ten o'clock in the morning the whole French army
was on the left bank of the Taro: at the same time, when it seemed
certain from the enemy's arrangements that battle was imminent, the
baggage, led by the captain, Odet de Reberac, was separated from the rear
guard, and retired to the extreme left.

Now, Francisco de Gonzaga, general-in-chief of the confederate troops,
had modelled his plans on those of the King of France; by his orders,
Count de Cajazzo, with four hundred men-at-arms and two thousand
infantry, had crossed the Taro where the Venetian camp lay, and was to
attack the French van; while Gonzaga himself, following the right bank as
far as Fornovo, would go over the river by the same ford that Charles had
used, with a view to attacking his rear. Lastly, he had placed the
Stradiotes between these two fords, with orders to cross the river in
their turn, so soon as they saw the French army attacked both in van and
in the rear, and to fall upon its flank. Not content with offensive
measures, Gonzaga had also made provision for retreat by leaving three
reserve corps on the right bank, one to guard the camp under the
instruction of the Venetian 'provveditori', and the other two arranged in
echelon to support each other, the first commanded by Antonio di
Montefeltro, the second by Annibale Bentivoglio.

Charles had observed all these arrangements, and had recognised the
cunning Italian strategy which made his opponents the finest generals in
the world; but as there was no means of avoiding the danger, he had
decided to take a sideway course, and had given orders to continue the