de la Trimouille, who had done quite enough to save them from the
suspicion of quailing before imaginary dangers, put a stop to this
enthusiasm, by pointing out that it would only be risking the loss of
their present advantage if they tried to push it farther with men and
horses so worn out. This view was adopted in spite of the opinion of
Trivulce, Camillo Vitelli, and Francesco Secco, who were all eager to
follow up the victory.

The king retired to a little village an the left bank of the Taro, and
took shelter in a poor house. There he disarmed, being perhaps among all
the captains and all the soldiers the man who had fought best.

During the night the torrent swelled so high that the Italian army could
not have pursued, even if they had laid aside their fears. The king did
not propose to give the appearance of flight after a victory, and
therefore kept his army drawn up all day, and at night went on to sleep
at Medesano, a little village only a mile lower down than the hamlet
where he rested after the fight. But in the course of the night he
reflected that he had done enough for the honour of his arms in fighting
an army four times as great as his own and killing three thousand men,
and then waiting a day and a half to give them time to take their
revenge; so two hours before daybreak he had the fires lighted, that the
enemy might suppose he was remaining in camp; and every man mounting
noiselessly, the whole French army, almost out of danger by this time,
proceeded on their march to Borgo San Donnino.

While this was going on, the pope returned to Rome, where news highly
favourable to his schemes was not slow to reach his ears. He learned
that Ferdinand had crossed from Sicily into Calabria with six thousand
volunteers and a considerable number of Spanish horse and foot, led, at