schemes of this kind and busied himself with loftier concerns, bending
all the force of his genius to restore the league of Italian princes that
had been broken by the defection of Sforza, the exile of Piero dei
Medici, and the defeat of Alfonso. The enterprise was more easily
accomplished than the pope could have anticipated. The Venetians were
very uneasy when Charles passed so near, and they trembled lest, when he
was once master of Naples, he might conceive the idea of conquering the
rest of Italy. Ludovico Sforza, on his side, was beginning to tremble,
seeing the rapidity with which the King of France had dethroned the house
of Aragon, lest he might not make much difference between his allies and
his enemies. Maximilian, for his part, was only seeking an occasion to
break the temporary peace which he had granted for the sake of the
concession made to him. Lastly, Ferdinand and Isabella were allies of
the dethroned house. And so it came about that all of them, for
different reasons, felt a common fear, and were soon in agreement as to
the necessity of driving out Charles VIII, not only from Naples, but from
Italy, and pledged themselves to work together to this end, by every
means in their power, by negotiations, by trickery, or by actual force.
The Florentines alone refused to take part in this general levy of arms,
and remained faithful to their promises.

According to the articles of the treaty agreed upon by the confederates,
the alliance was to last for five-and-twenty years, and had for
ostensible object the upholding of the majority of the pope, and the
interests of Christendom; and these preparations might well have been
taken for such as would precede a crusade against the Turks, if Bajazet's
ambassador had not always been present at the deliberations, although the
Christian princes could not have dared for very shame to admit the,
sultan by name into their league. Now the confederates had to set on
foot an army of 30,000 horse and 20,000 infantry, and each of them was