sometime prove of use, for as long as Spain held both banks at
the mouth of the Mississippi River, the right was of little
practical value.

Two subjects involving the greatest difficulty of arrangement
were the compensation of the Loyalists and the settlement of
commercial indebtedness. The latter was really a question of the
payment of British creditors by American debtors, for there was
little on the other side of the balance sheet, and it seems as if
the frugal Franklin would have preferred to make no concessions
and would have allowed creditors to take their own chances of
getting paid. But the matter appeared to Adams in a different
light--perhaps his New England conscience was aroused--and in
this point of view he was supported by Jay. It was therefore
finally agreed "that creditors on either side shall meet with no
lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling
money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted." However
just this provision may have been, its incorporation in the terms
of the treaty was a mistake on the part of the Commissioners,
because the Government of the United States had no power to give
effect to such an arrangement, so that the provision had no more
value than an emphatic expression of opinion. Accordingly, when
some of the States later disregarded this part of the treaty, the
British had an excuse for refusing to carry out certain of their
own obligations.

The historian of the Virginia Federal Convention of 1788,
H. B. Grigsby, relates an amusing incident growing out of the
controversy over the payment of debts to creditors in England: