whose state papers contain passages of fiercer violence in days
of tension. How much of his violence was genuine, how much was a
manner of speaking, his biographers have not had the courage to
determine. Like so many American biographers they have avoided
the awkward questions and have glanced over, as lightly as
possible, the persistent attempts of Congress to drive him from
office.

Nothing could shake the resolution of Davis to retain Benjamin in
the Cabinet. Among Davis's loftiest qualities was his sense of
personal loyalty. Once he had given his confidence, no amount of
opposition could shake his will but served rather to harden him.
When Benjamin as Secretary of War passed under a cloud, Davis led
him forth resplendent as Secretary of State. Whether he was wise
in doing so, whether the opposition was not justified in its
distrust of Benjamin, is still an open question. What is certain
is that both these able men, even before the crisis that arose in
the autumn of 1862, had rendered themselves and their Government
widely unpopular. It must never be forgotten that Davis entered
office without the backing of any definite faction. He was a
"dark horse," a compromise candidate. To build up a stanch
following, to create enthusiasm for his Administration, was a
prime necessity of his first year as President. Yet he seems not
to have realized this necessity. Boldly, firmly, dogmatically, he
gave his whole thought and his entire energy to organizing the
Government in such a way that it could do its work efficiently.
And therein may have been the proverbial rift within the lute. To
Davis statecraft was too much a thing of methods and measures,
too little a thing of men and passions.