prohibiting the African slave-trade. The quick eye of Davis had
detected in it a mode of evasion, for cargoes of captured slaves
were to be confiscated and sold at public auction. The President
had exposed this adroit subterfuge in his message vetoing the
bill, and the slavery-at-any-price men had not sufficient
influence in Congress to override the veto, though they muttered
against it in the public press.

The slavery-at-any-price men did not again conspicuously show
their hands until three years later when the Administration
included emancipation in its policy. The ultimate policy of
emancipation was forced upon the Government by many
considerations but more particularly by the difficulty of
securing labor for military purposes. In a country where the
supply of fighting men was limited and the workers were a class
apart, the Government had to employ the only available laborers
or confess its inability to meet the industrial demands of war.
But the available laborers were slaves. How could their services
be secured? By purchase? Or by conscription? Or by temporary
impressment?

Though Davis and his advisers were prepared to face all the
hazards involved in the purchase or confiscation of slaves, the
traditional Southern temper instantly recoiled from the
suggestion. A Government possessed of great numbers of slaves,
whether bought or appropriated, would have in its hands a
gigantic power, perhaps for industrial competition with private
owners, perhaps even for organized military control. Besides, the
Government might at any moment by emancipating its slaves upset
the labor system of the country. Furthermore, the opportunities