frivolous, that they are best answered by laughter or silence;
and we may quote the old saying, "I knew this before Theognis
arose." However, thus much shall be added, that the end of them
both is friendship,--in the first case with ourselves, in the
second with another. For he that hath attained to virtue by the
methods of philosophy hath his mind all in tune and good temper;
he is not struck with those reproaches of conscience, which cause
the acutest sense of pain and are the natural punishments of our
follies; but he enjoys (the great prerogative of a good man) to be
always easy and in amity with himself.

No factious lusts reason's just power control,
Nor kindle civil discord in his soul.

His passion does not stand in defiance to his reason, nor do his
reasonings cross and thwart one the other, but he is always
consistent with himself. But the very joys of wicked men are
tumultuary and confused, like those who dwell in the borders of two
great empires at variance, always insecure, and in perpetual
alarms; whilst a good man enjoys an uninterrupted peace and
serenity of mind, which excels the other not only in duration, but
in sense of pleasure too. As for the other sort of converse, that
which consists in expression of itself to others, Pindar says very
well, that it was not mercenary in old time, nor indeed is it so
now; but by the baseness and ambition of a few it is made use of to
serve their poor secular interests. For if the poets represent
Venus herself as much offended with those who make a trade and
traffic of the passion of love, how much more reasonably may we
suppose that Urania and Clio and Calliope have an indignation
against those who set learning and philosophy to sale?