prizes into French and Spanish ports to the great terror of our
merchants and shipowners?"

The naval forces of the Thirteen Colonies were pitifully feeble
in comparison with the mighty fleets of the enemy whose flaming
broadsides upheld the ancient doctrine that "the Monarchs of
Great Britain have a peculiar and Sovereign authority upon the
Ocean . . . from the Laws of God and of Nature, besides an
uninterrupted Fruition of it for so many Ages past as that its
Beginnings cannot be traced out."*

* "The Seaman's Vade-Mecum." London, 1744.


In 1776 only thirty-one Continental cruisers of all classes were
in commission, and this number was swiftly diminished by capture
and blockade until in 1782 no more than seven ships flew the flag
of the American Navy. On the other hand, at the close of 1777,
one hundred and seventy-four private armed vessels had been
commissioned, mounting two thousand guns and carrying nine
thousand men. During this brief period of the war they took as
prizes 733 British merchantmen and inflicted losses of more than
two million pounds sterling. Over ten thousand seamen were made
prisoners at a time when England sorely needed them for drafting
into her navy. To lose them was a far more serious matter than
for General Washington to capture as many Hessian mercenaries who
could be replaced by purchase.

In some respects privateering as waged a century and more ago was
a sordid, unlovely business, the ruling motive being rather a