seas. The American coast was safe; American commerce was safe
except in the vicinity of Spain; and the sea was open for the
passage of an American expeditionary force. Nearly the whole
island of Cuba was now under blockade, and the insurgents were
receiving supplies from the United States. It had been proved
that the fairly even balance of the two fleets, so anxiously
scanned when it was reported in the newspapers in April, was
entirely deceptive when it came to real efficiency in action.
Moreover, the skillful handling of the fleets by the Naval War
Board as well as by the immediate commanders had redoubled the
actual superiority of the American naval forces.

A fleet in being, even though inferior and immobilized, still
counts as a factor in naval warfare, and Cervera, though
immobilized by Sampson, himself immobilized the greater number of
American vessels necessary to blockade him. The importance of
this fact was evident to every one when, in the middle of June,
the remainder of the Spanish home fleet, whipped hastily into a
semblance of fighting condition, set out eastward under Admiral
Camara to contest the Philippines with Dewey. It was impossible
for the United States to detach a force sufficient to cross the
Atlantic and, without a base, meet this fleet in its home waters.
Even if a smaller squadron were dispatched from the Atlantic
round Cape Horn, it would arrive in the Philippines too late to
be of assistance to Dewey. The two monitors on the Pacific coast,
the Monterey and the Monadnock, had already been ordered across
the Pacific, a voyage perilous for vessels of their structure and
agonizing to their crews; but it was doubtful whether they or
Camara would arrive first in the Philippines.