While the press not only revealed but formulated courses of
action in the case of the army, the navy, at least, was able to
follow its own plans. For this difference there were several
causes, chief of which was the fact that the navy was a fully
professional arm, ready for action both in equipment and in
plans, and able to take a prompt initiative in carrying out an
aggressive campaign. The War Department had a more difficult task
in adjusting itself to the new conditions brought about by the
Spanish American War. The army was made up on the principle
traditionally held in the United States that the available army
force in time of peace should be just sufficient for the purposes
of peace, and that it should be enlarged in time of war. To allow
a fair amount of expansion without too much disturbance to the
organization in increasing to war strength, the regular army was
over-officered in peace times. The chief reliance in war was
placed upon the militia. The organization and training of this
force was left, however, under a few very general directions, to
the various States. As a result, its quality varied and it was
nowhere highly efficient in the military sense. Some regiments,
it is true, were impressive on parade, but almost none of the
officers knew anything of actual modern warfare. There had been
no preliminary sifting of ability in the army, and it was only as
experience gave the test that the capable and informed were
called into positions of importance. In fact, the training of the
regular officers was inferior to that of the naval officers. West
Point and Annapolis were both excellent in the quality of their
instruction, but what they offered amounted only to a college
course, and in the army there was no provision for systematic
graduate study corresponding to the Naval War College at Newport.