These difficulties and deficiencies, however, cannot fully
explain the woeful inferiority of the army to the navy in
preparedness. Fundamentally the defect was at the top. Russell A.
Alger, the Secretary of War, was a veteran of the Civil War and a
silver-voiced orator, but his book on the "Spanish-American War,"
which was intended as a vindication of his record, proves that
even eighteen months of as grueling denunciation as any American
official has ever received could not enlighten him as to what
were the functions of his office. Nor did he correct or
supplement his own incompetence by seeking professional advice.
There existed no general staff, and it did not occur to him, as
it did to Secretary Long, to create one to advise him
unofficially. He was on bad terms with Major General Nelson A.
Miles, who was the general in command. He discussed even the
details of questions of army strategy, not only with Miles but
with the President and members of the Cabinet. One of the most
extraordinary decisions made during his tenure of office was that
the act of the 9th of March, appropriating $50,000,000 "for
national defense," forbade money to be spent or even contracts to
be made by the quartermaster, the commissary, or the surgeon
general. In his book Secretary Alger records with pride the fact
that all this money was spent for coast defense. In view of the
fact that the navy did its task, this expenditure was absolutely
unnecessary and served merely to solace coast cities and munition
makers.

The regular army on April 1, 1898, consisted of 28,183 officers
and men. An act of the 26th of April authorized its increase to
about double that size. As enlistment was fairly prompt, by