which was effected in the form of the Government of the Cisalpine
Republic was likewise an act calculated to excite remonstrance on the
part of all the powers who were not entirely subject to the yoke of
France. He disguised the taking of Genoa under the name of a gift, and
the possession of Italy under the appearance of a mere change of
denomination. Notwithstanding these flagrant outrages the exclusive
apologists of Napoleon have always asserted that he did not wish for war,
and he himself maintained that assertion at St. Helena. It is said that
he was always attacked, and hence a conclusion is drawn in favour of his
love of peace. I acknowledge Bonaparte would never have fired a single
musket-shot if all the powers of Europe had submitted to be pillaged by
him one after the other without opposition. It was in fact declaring war
against them to place them under the necessity of breaking a peace,
during the continuance of which he was augmenting his power, and
gratifying his ambition, as if in defiance of Europe. In this way
Napoleon commenced all the wars in which he was engaged, with the
exception of that which followed the peace of Marengo, and which
terminated in Moreau's triumph at Hohenlinden. As there was no liberty
of the press in France he found it easy to deceive the nation. He was in
fact attacked, and thus he enjoyed the pleasure of undertaking his great
military expeditions without being responsible in the event of failure.

During the Emperor's stay in the capital of the new kingdom of Italy he
received the first intelligence of the dissatisfaction of Austria and
Russia. That dissatisfaction was not of recent date. When I entered on
my functions at Hamburg I learned some curious details (which I will
relate in their proper place) respecting the secret negotiations which
had been carried on for a considerable time previously to the
commencement of hostilities. Even Prussia was no stranger to the
dissatisfaction of Austria and Russia; I do not mean the King, but the