a single, though typical, aesthetic experience is insufficient;
a wide induction is necessary. Based on the experience of many
people, in face of the same object? But to many there would
be no aesthetic experience. On that of one person, over an
extensive field of objects? How, then, determine the limits
of this field? Half of the dispute of modern aesthetics is
over the right to include in the material for this induction
various kinds of enjoyment which are vivid, not directly
utilitarian, but traditionally excluded from the field. Guyan,
for instance, in a charming passage of his "Problemes de
l'Esthetique Contemporaine," argues for the aesthetic quality
of the moment when, exhausted by a long mountain tramp, he
quaffed, among the slopes of the Pyrenees, a bowl of foaming
milk. The same dispute appears, in more complicated form, in
the conflicting dicta of the critics.

If we do not know what part of our feeling is aesthetic feeling,
how can wee go farther? If the introspecting subject cannot
say, This is aesthetic feeling, it is logically impossible to
make his state of mind the basis for further advance. It is
clear that the great question is of what one has a right to
include in the aesthetic experience. But that one should have
such a "right" implies that there is an imperative element in
the situation, an absolute standard somewhere.

It seems to me that the secret of the difficulty lies in the
nature of the situation, with which an empirical treatment
must necessarily fail to deal. What we have called "the
aesthetic experience" is really a positive toning of the
general aesthetic attitude. This positive toning corresponds