take, but a surplus sufficient to provide for their
superannuation and pay back the debt due for their nurture.

The second is that the deliberate infliction of malicious
injuries which now goes on under the name of punishment be
abandoned; so that the thief, the ruffian, the gambler, and the
beggar, may without inhumanity be handed over to the law, and
made to understand that a State which is too humane to punish
will also be too thrifty to waste the life of honest men in
watching or restraining dishonest ones. That is why we do not
imprison dogs. We even take our chance of their first bite. But
if a dog delights to bark and bite, it goes to the lethal
chamber. That seems to me sensible. To allow the dog to expiate
his bite by a period of torment, and then let him loose in a much
more savage condition (for the chain makes a dog savage) to bite
again and expiate again, having meanwhile spent a great deal of
human life and happiness in the task of chaining and feeding and
tormenting him, seems to me idiotic and superstitious. Yet that
is what we do to men who bark and bite and steal. It would be far
more sensible to put up with their vices, as we put up with their
illnesses, until they give more trouble than they are worth, at
which point we should, with many apologies and expressions of
sympathy, and some generosity in complying with their last
wishes, then, place them in the lethal chamber and get rid of
them. Under no circumstances should they be allowed to expiate
their misdeeds by a manufactured penalty, to subscribe to a
charity, or to compensate the victims. If there is to be no
punishment there can be no forgiveness. We shall never have real
moral responsibility until everyone knows that his deeds are
irrevocable, and that his life depends on his usefulness.