dynasties, of the incursions of barbarous hordes, and of the
mental and political prostration of millions beneath the diadem,
the tiara, and the sword.

Great as the preponderance of the Persian over the Athenian power
at that crisis seems to have been, it would be unjust to impute
wild rashness to the policy of Miltiades, and those who voted
with him in the Athenian council of war, or to look on the after-
current of events as the mere result of successful indiscretion.
as before has been remarked, Miltiades, whilst prince of the
Chersonese, had seen service in the Persian armies; and he knew
by personal observation how many elements of weakness lurked
beneath their imposing aspect of strength. He knew that the bulk
of their troops no longer consisted of the hardy shepherds and
mountaineers from Persia Proper and Kurdistan, who won Cyrus's
battles: but that unwilling contingents from conquered nations
now largely filled up the Persian muster rolls, fighting more
from compulsion than from any zeal in the cause of their masters.
He had also the sagacity and the spirit to appreciate the
superiority of the Greek armour and organization over the
Asiatic, notwithstanding former reverses. Above all, he felt and
worthily trusted the enthusiasm of the men under his command.

The Athenians, whom he led, had proved by their new-born valour
in recent wars against the neighbouring states, that "Liberty and
Equality of civic rights are brave spirit-stirring things: and
they who, while under the yoke of a despot, had been no better
men of war than any of their neighbours, as soon as they were
free, became the foremost men of all; for each felt that in
fighting for a free commonwealth, he fought for himself, and,