same nature, and may be comprised under the single term wisdom. For,
whoever owns the firm and constant resolution of always using his
reason as well as lies in his power, and in all his actions of doing
what he judges to be best, is truly wise, as far as his nature
permits; and by this alone he is just, courageous, temperate, and
possesses all the other virtues, but so well balanced as that none
of them appears more prominent than another: and for this reason,
although they are much more perfect than the virtues that blaze
forth through the mixture of some defect, yet, because the crowd
thus observes them less, they are not usually extolled so highly.
Besides, of the two things that are requisite for the wisdom thus
described, namely, the perception of the understanding and the
disposition of the will, it is only that which lies in the will
which all men can possess equally, inasmuch as the understanding of
some is inferior to that of others. But although those who have only
an inferior understanding may be as perfectly wise as their nature
permits, and may render themselves highly acceptable to God by their
virtue, provided they preserve always a firm and constant resolution
to do all that they shall judge to be right, and to omit nothing
that may lead them to the knowledge of the duties of which they are
ignorant; nevertheless, those who preserve a constant resolution of
performing the right, and are especially careful in instructing
themselves, and who possess also a highly perspicacious intellect,
arrive doubtless at a higher degree of wisdom than others; and I see
that these three particulars are found in great perfection in your
Highness. For, in the first place, your desire of self-instruction
is manifest, from the circumstance that neither the amusements of
the court, nor the accustomed mode of educating ladies, which
ordinarily condemns them to ignorance, have been sufficient to
prevent you from studying with much care all that is best in the