is capricious, like liberty: it considers neither utility nor
labor; on the contrary, it seems that, in the ordinary course of
affairs, and exceptional derangements aside, the most useful
objects are those which are sold at the lowest price; in other
words, that it is just that the men who perform the most
attractive labor should be the best rewarded, while those whose
tasks demand the most exertion are paid the least. So that, in
following the principle to its ultimate consequences, we
reach the most logical of conclusions: that things whose use is
necessary and quantity infinite must be gratuitous, while those
which are without utility and extremely scarce must bear an
inestimable price. But, to complete the embarrassment, these
extremes do not occur in practice: on the one hand, no human
product can ever become infinite in quantity; on the other, the
rarest things must be in some degree useful, else they would not
be susceptible of value. Useful value and exchangeable value
remain, then, in inevitable attachment, although it is their
nature continually to tend towards mutual exclusion.

I shall not fatigue the reader with a refutation of the
logomachies which might be offered in explanation of this
subject: of the contradiction inherent in the idea of value there
is no assignable cause, no possible explanation. The fact of
which I speak is one of those called primitive,--that is, one of
those which may serve to explain others, but which in themselves,
like the bodies called simple, are inexplicable. Such is the
dualism of spirit and matter. Spirit and matter are two terms
each of which, taken separately, indicates a special aspect of
spirit, but corresponds to no reality. So, given man's needs of
a great variety of products together with the obligation of