number; the other of KIND.



SECT. VI. OF MODES AND SUBSTANCES


I would fain ask those philosophers, who found so much of their
reasonings on the distinction of substance and accident, and imagine we
have clear ideas of each, whether the idea of substance be derived from
the impressions of sensation or of reflection? If it be conveyed to us by
our senses, I ask, which of them; and after what manner? If it be
perceived by the eyes, it must be a colour; if by the ears, a sound; if
by the palate, a taste; and so of the other senses. But I believe none
will assert, that substance is either a colour, or sound, or a taste. The
idea, of substance must therefore be derived from an impression of
reflection, if it really exist. But the impressions of reflection resolve
themselves into our passions and emotions: none of which can possibly
represent a substance. We have therefore no idea of substance, distinct
from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other
meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it.

The idea of a substance as well as that of a mode, is nothing but a
collection of Simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and have
a particular name assigned them, by which we are able to recall, either
to ourselves or others, that collection. But the difference betwixt these
ideas consists in this, that the particular qualities, which form a
substance, are commonly referred to an unknown something, in which they
are supposed to inhere; or granting this fiction should not take place,
are at least supposed to be closely and inseparably connected by the