PHIL. Is it not an absurdity to think that the same thing should be at
the same time both cold and warm?

HYL. It is.

PHIL. Suppose now one of your hands hot, and the other cold, and that
they are both at once put into the same vessel of water, in an
intermediate state; will not the water seem cold to one hand, and warm to
the other?

HYL. It will.

PHIL. Ought we not therefore, by your principles, to conclude it is
really both cold and warm at the same time, that is, according to your
own concession, to believe an absurdity?

HYL. I confess it seems so.

PHIL. Consequently, the principles themselves are false, since you have
granted that no true principle leads to an absurdity.

HYL. But, after all, can anything be more absurd than to say, THERE IS
NO HEAT IN THE FIRE?

PHIL. To make the point still clearer; tell me whether, in two cases
exactly alike, we ought not to make the same judgment?

HYL. We ought.

PHIL. When a pin pricks your finger, doth it not rend and divide the